Talk:Self-deception

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Orwell's doublethink ("1984") may explain some paradoxes outlined in section Paradoxes of the article

The counter-arguments (against self-deception theories) based on paradoxes (in section Paradoxes) appear to presuppose that the self-deceiver is otherwise logical person and will not attempt to hold mutually contradictory believes. This, however, is an unproven hypothesis that is contradicted by numerous anecdotal evidence. For instance, it was observed by George Orwell that some individuals are capable of that. He referred to it as "doublethink".

Another example is provided by the so-called Kettle logic.

From a more theoretic perspective, a fully rational person whose inferences are free of fallacies would not be able to self-deceive without becoming irrational or illogical. However, there is nothing paradoxical about individuals who are irrational or illogical to hold mutually-contradictory believes, particularly if these individuals become defensive.

In other words, once one accepts a possibility of existence of individuals who are not fully rational and resort to fallacious inferences, or act defensively, the paradoxes (in section Paradoxes) fade away.

The said paradoxes are also invalidated by the fact that set theory, which is widely considered the foundation of modern mathematics, has no proof of its consistency. That leaves a mathematical possibility that mathematics does entail some mutually-contradictory theorems (that remain unknown to us at this time). Which means that despite the fact that the vast majority of mathematicians tent to be fully rational and very careful to not allow fallacies in their inferences, one cannot disprove that they all believe in mutually-contradictory statements - a fact known since Kurt Goedel's work some 100 years ago. Which leaves a mathematical possibility that they actually do believe in mutually-contradictory statements.

So, if mathematicians can believe in mutually-contradictory statements then there is nothing paradoxical about anyone else doing so.

172.88.197.74 (talk) 22:06, 21 June 2021 (UTC)

A flaw in Criticism

The following sentence (quoted from section Criticism of the article) contains a flaw that invalidates its conclusion:

"The concept of self-deception is criticized for being able to classify any [emphasis added] criticism of the notion of self-deception as being self-deception in itself, removing its falsifiability and therefore making it unscientific, and also for being an obstacle to science in general by being able to classify anything as self-deception in a way that confirms itself in a way that is not self-correcting."

The flaw lies in using the adverb any in lieu of some.

While it appears obvious that the concept of self-deception is able to classify some criticism of the notion of self-deception as being self-deception (or deception) in itself, it does not follow that the concept is able to debunk all criticism this way. For instance, one may still be able to demonstrate that the concept of self-deception is self-contradictory, or to provide empirical evidence that statistically significant random samples of population did not exhibit noticeable symptoms of self-deception.

Furthermore, the argument mentioned above that the concept of self-deception is unscientific, when applied to itself, proves its own unscientificity because it itself is unfalsifiable according to its own standard of falsifiability.

The above makes the said argument logically invalid.

On the other hand, it seems obvious that any sophisticated deceiver who employs self-deception has an incentive to attack the concept of self-deception as absurd, for instance, using the flawed argument analyzed above.

172.88.197.74 (talk) 23:06, 21 June 2021 (UTC)

No, the allegation of flaws and unscientificity in the argument is fallacious. If expression of criticism of the concept of self-deception is itself labelled as a symptom of self-deception and only individuals who do not express such criticism are classified as not showing noticeable symptoms of self-deception, then permission of studies showing some non-criticizing people as not self-deceiving does not make it falsifiable no matter if the non-expressers of criticism are considered statistically significant in the population. Individuals who express criticism of the concept of self-deception must be able to do so without being labelled as self-deceiving in order for falsifiability to work. An analogous case is that the concept of witchcraft does not become falsifiable just because one says that there may be a statistically significant part of the population who are not witches, but only if they do not say that witchcraft does not exist.

The theory that psychiatry can classify any criticism of the concept of self-deception as being self-deception itself is falsifiable, because it would be falsified if there was an argument against the entire concept of self-deception that psychiatry for fundamental reasons in the concept of self-deception itself could never classify as a symptom of self-deception. It is just that the fundamental concept of self-deception predicts no specific examples of such criticism. Specificity of predictions is necessary for falsifiability, for the sake of knowing what observations could falsify a theory. So the point that psychiatry can classify any criticism of the concept as self-deception is falsifiable, but no evidence against it have actually showed up. Just as is the case with the theory that no particle can move faster than the speed of light.2A02:AA1:1628:A992:39D0:B08:8425:3312 (talk) 06:38, 8 November 2021 (UTC)